Comparative Analysis of English and American Campaign Finance Laws by Fiori, Rod Stanton
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 11
Number 2 Winter 1988 Article 3
1-1-1988
Comparative Analysis of English and American
Campaign Finance Laws
Rod Stanton Fiori
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rod Stanton Fiori, Comparative Analysis of English and American Campaign Finance Laws, 11 Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 289
(1988).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol11/iss2/3
A Comparative Analysis of English and
American Campaign Finance Laws
By ROD STANTON FIORI
Member of the Class of 1988
I. INTRODUCHION
American campaign financing has been criticized and debated since
the nation's inception.1 Each of the past several Congresses has pro-
duced proposals to reform campaign finance legislation. In 1985 the Sen-
ate considered the Campaign Reform Act of 1985.2 The year 1987
witnessed a flurry of campaign finance reform proposals. The House of
Representatives produced the Campaign Cost Reduction and Reform
Act of 1987,3 and the Campaign Reform Act of 1987.4 The Senate con-
sidered the Informed Electorate Act of 19875 and the Senatorial Election
Act of 1987.6 The latter bill had the support of a majority of the Senate,7
but succumbed to filibusters in September 19878 and February 1988.1
None of the aforementioned bills has become law. This legislative activ-
ity shows that Congress is not content with the current system.
As this country engages in another presidential campaign in addi-
tion to the biannual congressional elections, Congress will again consider
campaign finance reform."0 To do so intelligently, Congress should ex-
amine the success or failure of earlier regulations, compare other legal
systems that apply similar regulations, and explore new schemes of cam-
1. See H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL
REFORm xi (2d ed. 1980).
2. S. 1806, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
3. H.R. 2464, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
4. H. 166, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
5. S. 593, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
6. S. 2., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
7. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1987, at A34, col. 1; San Francisco Exam., Feb. 25, 1988, at AS,
col. 1; San Diego Union, Feb. 26, 1988, at A2, col. 5; San Diego Union, Feb. 27, 1988, at A2,
coL 1.
8. Washington Post, Sept. 17, 1987, at A26, col. 1.
9. San Francisco Exam., Feb. 26, 1988, at A5, col. 1; San Diego Union, Feb. 27, 1988, at
A2, col. 1.
10. See San Francisco Exam., Feb. 26, 1988, at A5, col. 2; San Diego Union, Feb. 27,
1988, at A2, col. 1.
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paign finance regulation that are consistent with the first amendment.II
Scholars and commentators have written extensively on the various
means to regulate campaign finance; rarely, however, have they explored
beyond American borders and analyzed other systems. 12
English campaign finance laws incorporate many of America's past
and present approaches to regulation. Examination and comparison of
the campaign finance regulations of the two countries will allow each
country to share the successes and failures of their respective experiences
with the other. To learn and borrow from each other effectively, the
countries must appreciate the compatibilities and incongruities of the two
systems. While the United States system allows judicial review of the
constitutionality of legislation, England has a supreme Parliament with
no judicial review of constitutionality,"3 nor any of the checks and bal-
ances and separation of powers familiar to the American model. Both
systems, however, are representative democracies and call upon the judi-
ciary to interpret statutes. Both governments regulate campaigns for the
primary purpose of discouraging corruption. 4 Several of the regulatory
tools common to one or both systems are campaign expenditure limits,
contribution limits, disclosure requirements, regulations and subsidies for
use of the mails, and identification requirements.
This Note surveys American and English campaign finance regula-
tion. Section II of the Note examines expenditure limits. England em-
ploys rigorous spending limits at the expense of discouraging public
participation in campaigns. In America, most expenditure limits uncon-
stitutionally infringe upon the right of free speech.15 Nevertheless, Con-
gress continues to devote attention to this area of campaign finance. 16
Section III explores the parameters of contribution limits, with particular
attention paid to the practical effect of this regulation, and campaign
contributors' possible attempts to circumvent such regulation. Section
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), is the landmark case that held a panoply of
campaign finance regulations to unconstitutionally infringe upon the first amendment, See Id,
at 14, 23, 51, 54, 59.
12. But see Leonard, Contrasts in Selected Western Democracies: Germany, Sweden, Brit.
ain, in POLITICAL FINANCE 41 (H. Alexander ed. 1979); Note, Comparative Study of U.S. and
West German Political Finance Regulation: The Question of Contribution Controls, 4 HAS-
TINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 543 (1981).
13. P. WALES, THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION 13-14, 16 (1974).
14. See 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 380 (4th ed. 1977) (England); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25, 26-27 (1976) (America) In America, peripheral goals of campaign fi-
nance regulation include moderating the growth of campaign costs, equalizing the relative
financial ability of candidates, and equalizing the relative influence of contributors. Id, at 25.
15. See infra notes 73-104 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 157-175 and accompanying text.
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IV discusses disclosure requirements and the practicability of broadening
the scope of England's regulation in this area. Section V studies broad-
cast and postal regulations and subsidies. England provides television
and postal subsidies to its political parties and candidates.1 7 This section
also examines whether the American campaign finance system can bene-
fit from such subsidies. In conclusion, the best results are attainable
through a combination of various limited subsidies and legislation.
II. EXPENDITURE LIMITS: REGULATING THE
AMOUNT OF MONEY SPENT ON A CAMPAIGN
Expenditure limits regulate the amount of money spent on a cam-
paign. These expenditures may include money spent independently on
behalf of a candidate by a third party as well as money spent by the
candidate himself or herself.
A. English Regulation
Campaign finance regulation in England was first initiated under the
Corrupt Practices Prevention Act of 1854.18 This Act provided a system
of audits for election expenses. Expenditure limits were first employed by
the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act 188319 and remain part
of current law.2' This scheme provides for an initial threshold spending
limit that is then increased by a statutory amount that is multiplied by
the number of registered voters in the district.2 ' The Secretary of State
may raise or lower the expenditure limits at her discretion,12 thus keep-
ing the limits flexible and responsive to the economy. The expenditure
limits encompass the entire duration of the campaign; it is a question of
fact in each case as to when a candidate begins campaigning.' In addi-
tion, the law permits the candidate a budget of £60024 for reasonable
17. 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 700 (4th ed. 1977), citing COMmi.,TrEE ON
BROADCASTING REPORT, 1960, CMND. No. 1753, 294. See Leonard, supra note 12, at 41;
UK. Elections Shun Marathon Campaigns, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 21, 1983, at 34; Politics
American Style, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1987, at 41.
18. 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 380 (4th ed. 1977).
19. Id.
20. See eg., Representation of the People Act 1949, 13 Geo. 6, reprinted in 11 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 643 (3d ed. 1969 & Supp. 1985); and Representation of the
People Act 1983, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 557 (4th ed. 1986).
21. Representation of the People Act 1983, § 76, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STATUTES
OF ENGLAND 558 (4th ed. 1986).
22. Id. § 75A.
23. Elgin & Nairin Case, 5 O'MALLEY & HARDcAsTLES ELECTION CASES I at 5, re-
printed in 15 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 382, 383 (4th ed. 1977 & Supp. 1985).
24. As amended by Representation of the People Act 1983, § 14(2), reprinted in 15 HAts-
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
traveling and hotel expenses.25 The law excludes this amount from the
statutory spending limit. The Secretary of State may at her discretion
raise or lower the personal expense exclusion.26
1. Violations by Candidates and Their Agents
When candidates, their agents, or both "knowingly" act in contra-
vention of the spending limits, they are guilty of ark "illegal practice"27
and are subject to a fine.2" Parliament has distinguished an "illegal act"
from a "corrupt act."29 A "corrupt act" is more offensive and subject to
greater punishment."0 Examples of corrupt acts include unauthorized
expenditures by third-parties,31 bribery, 32 treating, 33 undue influence,3 4
voter fraud,35 and false declaration of election expenses.36 Examples of
illegal practices include spending in excess of prescribed limits37 and use
of literature without the name of the printer or publisher.38
Over the years Parliament has provided that candidates and their
agents may apply for relief when illegal acts or omissions arise from "in-
advertence" or "miscalculation. '39 No such relief has been provided for
a corrupt practice. The courts have interpreted the relief statutes liber-
ally and have applied them generously.' The courts seem to have devel-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 553-554 (4th ed. 1986). The amount is approximately
equivalent to $1050.
25. Representation of the People Act 1949, 13 Geo. 6, § 103, reprinted in 11 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 558 (3d ed. 1969 & Supp. 1985).
26. Representation of the People Act 1983, § 76A(i), reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 559 (4th ed. 1986).
27. Representation of the People Act 1983, § 76(1), reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 559 (4th ed. 1986).
28. Id. § 169.
29. Compare id. § 169 with id. § 168.
30. Representation of the People Act 1983, § 169(I)(a), reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 639 (4th Ed. 1986).
31. Id. § 75(5). Discussed infra at notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
32. Id. § 113.
33. Id. § 114. Treating is a hybrid of bribery where a candidate or her agent provides
food, drink or entertainment to a voter with the intent to influence such a voter.
34. Id. § 115.
35. Id. § 60. This is known as "personification."
36. Id. § 82(6).
37. Id. § 76.
38. Id. § 110(3). Discussed infra at notes 300-303 and accompanying text.
39. Most recently enacted as Representation of the People Act 1983, § 167, reprinted In
15 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 637 (4th ed. 1986).
40. See, eg., In re Richmond (East Sheen Ward) Borough Council Election, 67 L.G.R,
415 (1969) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (inexperienced candidate and election agent
miscalculated expenses. Party petitioned for relief seven months after discovery and petition
was granted.); In re Bedwellty Constituency Parliamentary Election, 63 L.G.R. 406 (1965)
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oped an unwritten policy of leniency because strict interpretation and
application of the statutes may deter prospective candidates from run-
ning for office if there is a strong risk of public prosecution due to poor
bookkeeping.
2. Unauthorized Expenditures by Third Parties
The Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act of 1883 did not
control unauthorized third-party expenditures. Although the candidate
and his agents could spend only up to a limit imposed by statute, an
unauthorized individual or organization spending independently on be-
half of a candidate would have no corresponding expenditure limit.41
Thirty-five years later, Parliament chose to regulate this activity in the
Representation of the People Act of 1918.42 Parliament has re-enacted
this regulation in the Representation of the People Acts of 1949"3 and
1983 4. The 1983 Act makes it a corrupt practice for any person45 to
incur expenses exceeding to £54 (in the aggregate) not authorized by the
candidate or her agent.47 In circumstances where the third-party holds
public meetings or organizes "any public display" or issues "advertise-
ments, circulars, or publications," that third party is guilty even when he
or she spends less than £5.4" It must be shown, however, that the third
party intended to promote or procure the election of a candidate.49
In contrast to the application for relief available to candidates and
their agents who break expenditure limits (an illegal act),' Parliament
has provided no such relief for third parties when they violate spending
statutes (which is a corrupt act).5"
(Candidate's inexperienced agent miscalculated the applicable spending limit. The court
granted relief.).
41. Hartlepool's Case, 6 O'MALLEY & HARDCASTLE'S ELECriON CASES I at 9 (1910),
cited in 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 388 (4th ed. 1977).
42. 8 Geo. 5, § 34, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 388-89 (4th d.
1977).
43. Representation of the People Act 1949, 13 Geo. 6, § 63, reprinted in 11 HALsBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 609 (3d ed. 1969).
44. Id. § 75, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 554 (4th ed. 1986).
45. Hereinafter denoted in this context as "third-parties."
46. This amount is approximately equivalent to S8.75.
47. Representation of the People Act 1983, § 75(1), reprinted in 15 HALSnURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 554 (4th ed. 1986).
48. Id. § 75(1)(a), (b).
49. Grieve v. Dougleas-Home, 1965 S.L.T. 186, 190, as cited in 15 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 554 (4th ed. 1986).
50. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
51. The distinction between the two is explained supra at notes 29.40 and accompanying
text.
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
English courts have held that monies the parties spend in a General
Election52 promulgating the party's dogma do not come within the pur-
view of the Representation of the People Act. 3 Similarly, the Act does
not apply when others incur expenses to promote general philosophical
or political views.54 If such an endorsement or attack applies to a polit-
ical party, the statement should be distributed as widely as possible so
that a court will not interpret it as a promotion or criticism of candidates
in any particular precincts. 5
Two prominent cases illustrate the ramifications of third-party
spending regulations. In Regina v. Tronoh Mines, Ltd.,6 the defendants
placed an advertisement in a nationwide newspaper criticizing the La-
bour Party. The Government charged defendants with incurring an un-
lawful expense in violation of section 63 of the Representation of the
People Act of 1949," 7 with a view to promote or procure a candidate for
an election. The Appeals Court ruled, however, that the statute did not
apply since the advertisement was not directed at candidate or a particu-
lar constituency." The spending in this case is an example of support for
or against a party in general and therefore, the statute did not apply.
In Director of Public Prosecutions v. Luft,5 9 the defendants distrib-
uted pamphlets and posters in their precincts that said, "Don't Vote Na-
tional Front." The court found the defendants guilty of incurring an
unlawful unauthorized expenditure in violation of section 63 of the Rep-
resentation of the People Act of 1949. The House of Lords held that
expenditures in targeted precincts directed against one party amounted
to support for the other parties, when such expenditures are directed in
precincts in which more than one candidate is running. 60
The Luft Court relied on an earlier precedent, Regina v. Hailwood
52. A General Election is when the position of the Prime Minister is to be decided by the
Parliament, after a parliamentary election. Unlike America, English citizens do not vote di-
rectly for their national leader. Rather, they vote for the party of their desired leader by voting
for the parliamentary candidate in their district who is a member of that same party. If that
party becomes a majority, or otherwise forms a majority coalition, then that party may choose
the Prime Minister. See P. WALES, THE BRMSH CONSTrTUTION 15, 16 (1974).
53. See 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 388-89 (4th ed. 1977), citing Grieve v. Doug-
las-Home, S.L.T. 186 (1965).
54. See Regina v. Tronoh Mines, Ltd., 1 All E.R. 697 (1952).
55. See Director of Public Prosecutions v. Luft, 2 All E.R. 569 (1976).
56. 1 All E.R. 697 (1952).
57. Now found in Representation of the People Act 1983, § 7:5, reprinted in 15 HALS-
BURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 554 (4th ed. 1986).
58. 1 All E.R. 697 (1952) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
59. 2 All E.R. 569 (1976) (LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file).
60. The House of Lords is the highest court in England. P. WALES, supra note 52, at 98.
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and Ackroyds Ltd,61 that declared expenditures resulting in precinct-
wide (as opposed to nationwide) attacks on one political party as tanta-
mount to support for the other candidate in that precinct. Indeed, a re-
cent decision declared that distribution of posters and pamphlets
attacking the government amounted to an attack on the ruling party and
therefore, constituted an unlawful expenditure.62 Luft may be reconciled
with Tronoh as follows: It is permissible to expend money to attack or
support a political party as long as such a promulgation is indiscrimi-
nately promoted, and not limited to one precinct (as in Haihvood) or
several targeted precincts (as in Luft) in which more than one candidate
is running.
If the rationale of this result is to check corruption, then the courts
and Parliament apparently consider it most effective to combat corrup-
tion at the precinct level. The application of this limitation in Tronoh
and Luft apparently illustrates that when an individual expends money
to defeat a party in a particular precinct, Parliament views the individual
as having a corrupting influence on the other candidates in that precinct.
Yet, when an individual spends money to defeat a party nationally, no
such corrupting influence exists. Similarly, when an individual spends
money indiscriminately to elect a party, Parliament does not see a cor-
rupting relationship between the individual and the winning party.
This premise could be accurate if members of Parliament wielded
significant power outside their parties, as is often the case in America. In
England, however, party members are only as strong as their parties.
The Prime Minister is at the apex of a party's power, but exists only for
the party in control of the government.6 3 Therefore, if an individual
wished to optimize her influence over Parliament she would spend
money promoting the party on a nationwide basis, which is legal, rather
than concentrating on a few particular races, which is not.
Parliament may be more concerned about improper influence over
an individual member of Parliament, rather than the party in general.
That is, the anonymous party as a whole would be less susceptible to
improper influences. 64 Parliament may also prefer not to publicize indi-
vidual races out of a wish to focus on the party platform rather than
61. 2 K.B. 277 (1928).
62. Paul and Another v. National and Local Goverment Officers' Association, IR.LR.
413 (1987). This court was construing provisions of the Trade Union Act of 1913, which has
prohibitions similar to the Representation of the People Act 1983.
63. Control is gained when a party is an absolute majority or otherwise forms a working
majority.
64. But see discussion infra notes 225-230 and accompanying text.
19881
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individual candidates. Finally, since the law encourages donations to the
candidate and the party over independent expenditures, the parties retain
control over how money is spent, thus enabling them to focus on the
issues rather than having the electorate do so with its own independent
media blitz.
While these expenditure limits may discourage corruption on an in-
dividual level, they would offend American views of' freedom of speech,
assembly, and association. English regulations expressly ban public
meetings not sanctioned by the candidate if the promotion of that candi-
date's election is discussed.65 Furthermore, as the Tronoh and Luft cases
illustrate, judges must decide whether a statement is an attack on a can-
didate or simply a generalized philosophical statement.66 Finally, the
legislation is inconsistent; antithetical to the Representation of the People
Act67 is the Trade Union Act of 1913, as amended in 1984.68 The latter
provides an elaborate scheme whereby trade union money can be spent to
promote or defeat the election of a candidate. 69
B. Campaign Expenditure Limits in America
1. From Muckrakers to Common Cause: Feeble, Unenforced, or
Circumvented Laws
In response to the prodding of Theodore Roosevelt and his hearty
band of reformers known as "Muckrakers,"7 Congress first introduced
campaign expenditure limits in its 1911 amendment to the "Act provided
for the Publicity of Contributions Made for the Purpose of Influencing
Elections at Which Representatives of Congress Are Elected. '71 This
amendment limited House candidates' expenditures to $5000 and Senate
candidates' expenditures to $10,000.72 The amendment made no provi-
sions for the presidential campaign. Violators of the Act were liable for
either a $1000 fine, or one year in jail, or both.73 Contrary to the English
65. Representation of the People Act 1983, § 75, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STATUTES
OF ENGLAND 554 (4th ed. 1986).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 56-62.
67. Id.
68. Trade Union Act 1913, § 3, as amended by § 17 of the 1917 Amendment, reprinted In
37 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1008 (3d ed. 1972) and 54(a) HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND, ACCUMULATIVE UPDATE 2511 (3d ed. 1985).
69. Id
70. See Note, Political Action Committees and the Supreme Court, 12 W. ST. U.L. R V.
281, 282, 283 (1984).
71. Ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25, 28 (1911).
72. Id.
73. Ch. 392, § 10, 36 Stat. 822, 824 (1910).
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laws,7 4 the Act did not regulate third-party spending.
Similar to the British tradition, 75 personal expenditures were ex-
empt.76 The Act, however, defined personal expenses to include expendi-
tures such as those for postage, writing, printing (other than in a
newspaper), distribution of letters, circulars, posters, telegraph, and tele-
phone expenses.' The large list of exceptions practically swallowed the
rule. Thus, there began a history of feeble legislation that was largely
ignored, circumvented, or unenforced." The constitutionality of expen-
diture limits was challenged in Newberry v. United States.79 The
Supreme Court held that Congress had unconstitutionally usurped the
states' right to regulate the primary elections.8" In 1925 Congress re-
sponded with the Federal Corrupt Practices Act8" (FCPA), which still
provided for expenditure regulations. The FCPA, however, expressly ex-
cluded primaries and party conventions.82 The FCPA permitted Senate
candidates to make primary expenditures of $10,000 and permitted
House candidates to spend $2500, "or an amount equal to the amount
obtained by multiplying 3 cents by the total number of votes cast at the
last election for all the candidates for the office which the candidate
seeks, but in no event exceeding $25,000" for a Senate candidate or
$5000 for a House candidate."3 Other provisions" were similar or identi-
cal to those in the 1911 amendment.8 5
Once again the feebleness of the FCPA speaks for itself. In 1911,
the law allowed a Senate candidate to spend $10,000 on behalf of her
entire campaign.86 Fourteen years later, a candidate could spend S10,000
to $25,000 after the primary campaign.8 7 While House candidates saw a
decrease of expenditure limits of up to fifty percent (since they were per-
74. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 25 and accompanying text
76. Ch. 392, § 8, 36 Stat. 822, 824 (1910).
77. M.
78. See Common Cause v. Democratic National Committee, 333 F. Supp. 803, 806
(1971); Note, Comparative Study of U.S: and West German Political Finance Regulation: The
Question of Contribution Controls, 4 HASnNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 543, 550 (1981); Note,
supra note 70, at 284; and infra notes 81, 90, 96, 197, 245 and accompanying text.
79. 256 U.S. 232 (1921).
80. Id. at 255-258.
81. Ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925).
82. Id. § 302, 43 Stat. 1070, 1070.
83. Id. § 309, 43 Stat. 1070, 1073.
84. See id. §§ 301-319, 43 Stat. 1070, 1070-74.
85. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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mitted up to $5000 in expenditures under the 1911 amendment"8 ), the
large list of exclusions known as personal expenditures negated much of
the impact the FCPA may have had. In 1941, the Supreme Court over-
turned Newberry, holding that Congress could regulate primary
elections.89
In 1948, as part of a larger act designed to codify crimes and crimi-
nal procedure, 90 Congress enacted expenditure limits inclusive of the
primaries and applicable to third parties (1948 Act). Section 608 of the
1948 Act provided that:
Whoever purchases... goods... advertising... of any kind...
the proceeds of which, or any portion thereof, directly or indirectly
inures to the benefit of or for any candidate for an elective federal office
... or [for] the success of any national party shall be fined not more
than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years.91
This provision was unique because it included presidential cam-
paigns heretofore only nominally regulated. 92 Far more startling, how-
ever, was the apparent strict liability nature of the statute,93 coupled with
its denial of freedom of expression for third parties. 4 Section 609 pro-
vided for an annual $3 million expenditure limit for political
committees.95
Prior to 1971, no published cases in which the 1948 Act was liti-
gated were available. Over the years, however, the Act was mentioned six
times in opinions dealing with peripheral issues.96 Therefore, it is appar-
88. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
89. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941).
90. Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 683 (1948).
91. Id., 62 Stat. 683, 723.
92. The 1910 Act and its 1911 amendment, Ch. 33, 37 Stat. 25 (1911), and the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act, Ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925), did not regulate presidential campaigns,
93. The statute has no mention of intent nor similar prerequisites for its violation,
94. The plain meaning of the statute suggests that someone who pays a dollar to a polit-
ical party or candidate for a 50-cent bumper sticker is in violation of this Act. Ch. 645, § 608,
62 Stat. 683, 723 (1948).
95. The term "political committee" includes any committee, association, or organization
which accepts contributions or makes expenditures for the purpose of influencing or attempt-
ing to influence the election of candidates or presidential and vice presidential electors (1) in
two or more States, or (2) whether or not in more than one State if such committee, associa.
tion, or organization (other than a duly organized State or local committee of a political party)
is a branch or subsidiary of a national committee, association, or organization. Ch. 645, § 591,
62 Stat. 683, 719 (1948).
96. See United States v. Doto, 205 F.2d 416, 419 (1953); Rumely v. United States, 197
F.2d 166, 186 (1952) (dissent); Calhoun v. Doster, 324 F. Supp. 736, 739 (1971); United States
v. Painters Union Local No. 48, 179 F. Supp. 516, 521 (1948); United States v. International
Union of United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement Workers of Am., 352 U.S. 567 (1957).
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ent that judges (and the United States Attorney's Office) were familiar
with the provision. Finally, in 1971, Common Cause moved for an in-
junction to have the law enforced against the major political parties.9
Although Common Cause was certified as a class and permitted to move
forward on the injunction,98 Congress enacted the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act of 197199 (FECA 1971), which substantially amended section
608 oo and repealed section 609,101 and thus rendered the class action
moot.
2. The Modern Era: Reform Versus the First Amendment
FECA 1971, which was applicable to candidates for federal office,1°Z
eliminated all but two expenditure limitations. One provision put a ceil-
ing on how much money a candidate or her immediate family could
spend on her own campaign.' 0 3 This provision was not challenged until
1975.' 0 The second expenditure provision put a cap'1 s on how much a
candidate could spend on communications media. °6 This provision was
never challenged, but was repealed by the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1974 (FECA 1974).107
FECA 1971 was a congressional response to increasing campaign
expenses in general.108 In 1974 during the post-Watergate era, Congress
once again produced expenditure limits for federal campaigns under the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA 1974).' 09 This legisla-
tion was not to be a paper tiger, however, for it set up its own enforce-
ment agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC).110 FECA 1974
was the most significant and comprehensive campaign finance legislation
ever passed, if only for that reason."'
FECA 1974 contained several expenditure limits. First, FECA
97. Common Cause v. Democratic National Committee, 333 F. Supp. 803 (1971).
98. Id. at 815.
99. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
100. Id. § 203, 86 Stat. 3, 9.
101. Id. § 204, 86 Stat. 3, 10.
102. Id. § 104, 86 Stat. 3, 5.
103. Id. § 203, 86 Stat. 3, 9.
104. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
105. Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 104, 86 Stat. 3, 5 (1972).
106. "Communications media" was defined as television, radio, newspapers, magazines,
telephone, and billboards. Id. § 102, 86 Stat. 3, 3.
107. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263 (1974).
108. Note, Comparative Study of US and West German Political Finance Regulation,
supra note 78, at 543; Note, supra note 70, at 284.
109. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 310, 88 Stat. 1263, 1280 (1974).
110. Id., 88 Stat. 1263, 1280-82.
111. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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1974 left intact the FECA 1971 regulation relating to the candidate and
her immediate family's contribution to her own campaign."1 2 Second, as
in England, overall campaign expenditure limits were employed-$10
million for presidential primaries, $20 million for the general election. t 3
Senate and House candidates were permitted to make expenditures total-
ling eight cents multiplied by the number of people eligible to register to
vote in their district or $100,000, whichever was greater.1 1 4 Similar to the
English experience, FECA 1974 excluded personal expenses.1 15 Third,
expenditure limits were placed upon the political parties in connection
with a general election of presidential candidates. 16 Fourth, independ-
ent expenditures (third-party spending) could not exceed $1000.117 Con-
gress foresaw a potential Luft problem 1 8 in this expenditure limit: the
likely unconstitutional result of prosecuting individuals for hanging a few
posters. Apparently, Congress felt that this problem could be prevented
by permitting a $1000 expenditure limit.
Expenditure limits were to be adjusted annually according to
changes in the Consumer Price Index.119 Violations of FECA 1974
could result in a $25,000 fine and up to a year of incarceration. 120
Among other things, the statute provided for disclosure of campaign ac-
counts,121 contribution limits,1 22 and a public finance scheme for funding
112. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1264 (1974). In contrast, England has no
comparable expenditure limit on how much of his or her personal wealth a candidate spends
on his or her own election as long as this spending conforms to the overall expenditure limits.
See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
113. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1264 (1974).
114. Id. A slightly different variation was employed for candidates running in states that
had only one representative in the House.
115. Id. § 102, 88 Stat. 1263, 1271. However, the American personal expenses could con.
stitute a generous 20% of the total campaign expenditure. Id.
116. Id. § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1265. Party expenditures were limited to "an amount equal
to 2 cents multiplied by the voting age population of the United States." As discussed earlier,
England has no expenditure limits placed upon its political parties, only on individual candi-
dates and third parties. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
117. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (1974).
118. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
119. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1265 (1974). This method is more mechani-
cal than the method used in England, where expenditure limits may be changed at the discre-
tion of the secretary of state. The secretary of state, being an incumbent, would likely
manipulate the expenditure limits to her party's advantage. For example, if her party had
greater fundraising capacity than its rivals, she would likely raise the expenditure limits, or she
might keep the expenditure limits low, thereby capitalizing on her fellow incumbents' name
recognition, thus denying the opposition parties ample expenditure limits to overcome this
apparent advantage.
120. Id. § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1266.
121. See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
122. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
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presidential elections."2 3
FECA 1974 was to become effective starting in 1975.124 The statute
provided, however, that any eligible voter could challenge it and that the
courts were to give that case priority on the docket. 12 The Act was
challenged immediately by a coalition representing the political spec-
trum: James Buckley, the conservative senator from New York, joined
Eugene McCarthy, pied piper of the antiwar movement, and the New
York Civil Liberties Union allied with the American Conservative
Union.1 2
6
The result was Buckley v. Valeo.127 In a per curiam opinion, the
Supreme Court struck down all expenditure limits unless a candidate vol-
untarily sought public financing. The Government argued that it had a
compelling interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corrup-
tion, equalizing the relative ability of individuals and groups to influence
the outcome of elections, equalizing the relative financial resources of
candidates competing for elective office, and reducing the cost of political
campaigns. 12 The Court rejected each of these interests 129 but one: the
Government -did have a compelling interest in preventing corruption or
the appearance of corruption. 30 Expenditure limits, however, were not
the proper means of enforcing that interest. The Court found that "ex-
penditure ceilings impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity
of free speech .... It is clear that a primary effect on these expenditure
limitations is to restrict the quantity of campaign speeches .... "3'
Regarding third-party expenditure regulations, the Court ques-
tioned the effectiveness of such a scheme, declaring it "naive," and sug-
gested that circumvention was likely.132 Turning to spending limits
imposed upon a candidate's use of his family's own money, the Court
praised the antithesis of the regulation: "Indeed, the use of personal
funds reduces the candidate's dependence on outside contributors."' 1 3
The Court did approve of expenditure limits placed upon a presidential
123. See infra notes 134-151 and accompanying text.
124. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 410, 88 Stat. 1263, 1304 (1974).
125. Id § 315, 88 Stat. 1263, 1285-86.
126. Note, supra note 70, at 289.
127. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
128. Id at 25-26.
129. Id. at 47-48. The Court found these interests to be "wholly foreign to the First
Amendment." Id. at 49.
130. Id. at 47-48.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Id. at 45.
133. Id. at 47.
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candidate who voluntarily seeks public funds. 134
Later, Congress enacted section 9012(f) of the :Presidential Election
Campaign Fund Act, prohibiting third-party expenditures exceeding
$1000 to further the election of a publicly funded presidential candidate
in the general election. 135 In FEC v. National Conservative Political Ac-
tion Committee, 36 the defendants were charged with violating Section
9012(f) in seeking to make independent unauthorized expenditures ex-
ceeding $1000 on behalf of President Reagan's 1984 reelection cam-
paign. 137 The Supreme Court found the expenditure limits at issue
unconstitutional because the prohibited conduct was entitled to first
amendment protection, 138 and no sufficient governmental interest justi-
fied the prohibition. 139 In accepting public financing, apparently a candi-
date may waive his first amendment right of unlimited spending, but may
not waive that right for third-parties.
3. Permissible Regulation Under Buckley: A Proposal
Scholars continue to advocate the constitutionality of expenditure
regulation, arguing for a reversal of Buckley.""4 A more practical ap-
proach, however, may be to explore expenditure regulations permissible
within the confines of Buckley. This approach requires a closer examina-
tion of the only expenditure limits held constitutional: those employed in
the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act.
Under this Act, a fund is created by voluntary contributions made
by taxpayers who check the appropriate box on their income tax return,
thus donating one dollar.141 In order to have access to this fund for the
primary campaign, the candidate must agree to an expenditure ceiling of
$22 million'42 for the primary campaign, must agree not to spend more
than $50,000 of her own money in their quest for her party's nomina-
134. Id. at 87. The Court reaffirmed this rule in Republican National Committee v. FEC,
487 F. Supp. 280 (1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 955 (1980).
135. 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1982).
136. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
137. Id. at 483.
138. Id. at 490-96.
139. Id. at 496-501.
140. Forrester, The New Constitutional Right to Buy Elections. 69 A.B.A.J. 1078, 1082
(1983).
141. 26 U.S.C. § 6046 (1982).
142. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982). This figure is tied to the Consumer Price Index. The FEC
has calculated that $22 million be the spending limit for each presidential candidate in the
1988 primaries, with an additional $5 million in expenditures allotted for fundraising costs,
thus permitting up to $27 million in expenditures for the primary campaign. FEC RECORD,
Jan. 1988, at 6, 6.
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tion, 43 and must raise over $5000 in contributions from residents in each
of at least twenty states, excluding any contributions to the extent they
exceed $250."4 Candidates then become eligible for matching funds.
Each contribution is matched by the United States Treasury dollar for
dollar up to $250 per contribution.1 45 The maximum amount of match-
ing funds an eligible candidate may receive is equal to half the overall
spending limit for the primary campaign.146 Since the FEC has deter-
mined the presidential primary limit for 1988 to be $22 million,"4 7 the
candidates are eligible to receive up to $11 million in matching funds.
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act also provides for
funding of the major and minor parties' conventions.1 4 Major parties
are permitted to spend and are reimbursed for up to $4 million.149 Fi-
nally, the 1988 nominees of the major parties will be given $44 million to
spend for the general election campaign. 5 ' Special provisions are pro-
vided for the minor parties."' The Act imposes criminal sanctions
against those who knowingly violate it.152 The Act further provides that
when the fund is insufficient to pay the candidates the entire statutory
amount, they are to receive their share pro rata.15 3
Congress, by way of Senator Boren, has recently considered legisla-
tion on a similar scheme to finance Senate elections ("Boren Bill").'54
Under this proposal, candidates who voluntarily comply to formulated
expenditure limits and raise a specified threshold amount of money, in
$250 denominations or less, would be matched dollar for dollar up to
that threshold amount.1 5 Originally an increase in the voluntary income
tax check-off provision from one dollar to two dollars was to fund this
scheme.'56 This part of the bill was deleted, 5 and probably rightfully
143. 26 U.S.C. § 9034(b) (1982).
144. 26 U.S.C. § 9033(b) (1982).
145. That is, a contribution of SO to $250 is matched SO to S250, whereas a contribution of
$250 to $1000 is matched with $250.
146. 26 U.S.C. § 9034(b) (1982).
147. FEC RECORD, supra note 142, at 6.
148. For definitions of major and minor parties, see 26 U.S.C. § 9002(6)-(7) (1982).
149. 26 U.S.C. § 9008 (Supp. IV 1986).
150. 26 U.S.C. § 9004 (1982). This amount is tied to the consumer price index. FEC
RECORD, supra note 142, at 6.
151. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9008(b)(2), (d)(2), 9003(c) (1982).
152. 26 U.S.C. § 9012 (1982).
153. 26 U.S.C. § 9006(c) (1982).
154. Senatorial Election Act of 1987, S. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
155. Id §§ 502, 504.
156. IdL § 512.
157. Boren, Special Interest Money: A Threat to Democratic Government, 14 PEPPERDINE
L. REv. 567, 569 (1987).
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so. The public response has been lukewarm towards providing revenue
for the presidential scheme.15 1 Since 1982 only twenty-three to twenty-
four percent of income tax returns had the "contribute $1" box desig-
nated.1 59 Many of these taxpayers filing returns contributed $2 because
they were filing joint returns. As of January 1987,1&I the fund contained
over $114 million. 6 As of January 13, 1988, thirteen candidates had
qualified for matching funds of more than $33 million. 162 The FEC has
determined that candidates may qualify for up to :311 million each in
1988.163 This determination means that up to $143 million could be
payable to the thirteen candidates, which would likely exhaust the
fund."' While such scenario is unlikely for the Presidential campaigns,
with thirty-three Senate campaigns occurring every two years,1 61 it is
quite possible the system would not remain solvent.
Additional regulations only discourage prospective challengers and
create an attorneys' full employment act in an already pervasively regu-
lated industry. Most importantly, the Boren Bill's expenditure limits are
unrealistically low. 1 66 For example, in California, postprimary nominees
could spend $5.5 million. 67 In the 1986 Senate race in California for the
general election, the incumbent spent $7,295,074, and the challenger
$8,354,809. 168 Furthermore, since third-party expenditure regulation
under this or any other scheme is unconstitutional, 169 the effectiveness of
this proposal seems to be diminished.
Finally, there is the "October Surprise" syndrome. When a candi-
date has reached his spending limit, he will not be able to respond to late
158. FEC RECORD, supra note 142, at 6.
159. As reported by the Federal Election Commission. This correspondence is available at
the offices of the Hastings International and Comparative Law Review, or can be confirmed by
telephoning the Commission at (800)424-9530 or (202)326-3120.
160. Id.
161. FEC RECORD, Feb. 1988, at 1, 1.
162. Id
163. Id
164. When the fund is insufficient to pay the candidates the entire statutory amount, they
are to be paid their share pro rata. 26 U.S.C. § 9006(c) (1982).
165. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, 1 2.
166. Section 503(b) of the Boren Bill, S. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 503(b) (1987), provided
the following formula for calculating expenditure limits: $600,000 plus $0.25 multiplied by the
voting age population.
167. California's approximate voting age population of 19,600,000 multiplied by $0.25 is
$4,900,000, add the $600,000 base and $5.5 million results. See San Francisco Exam., Feb. 26,
1988, at A5, col. 1; San Diego Union, Mar. 11, 1988, at BlI, col. 1.
168. As reported by the Federal Election Commission. This correspondence is available at
the offices of the Hastings International & Comparative Law Review, or can be confirmed by
telephoning the Commission at (800)424-9530 or (202)376-3120.
169. See supra notes 132-136 and accompanying text.
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developing issues and ad hominem attacks170 without risking criminal
prosecution. Admittedly, this problem has not occurred at the presiden-
tial level.' 7 ' The Boren Bill did provide for a so-called "insurance pol-
icy" to protect candidates against opponents who chose not to comply
with the spending limits.17  A candidate who complied with the spend-
ing limits could, up to a certain point, receive additional grants matching
the expenditure levels of noncomplying adversaries, and eventually
would be permitted to raise and spend unlimited amounts. Not only
would such a scheme fail to adequately contain campaign costs, it as-
sumes the financial solvency of the matching fund. All things consid-
ered, a proposal of this type, although constitutional, would probably
create an unpopular bureaucracy, require popular support, and be of de-
batable effectiveness.
The House of Representatives, through the Campaign Cost Reduc-
tion and Reform Act of 1987,173 recently sought another way to induce
expenditure limits. Under the bill, House candidates that agreed to
spending limits of $200,000 per primary election and $200,000 per gen-
eral election 74 would receive a thirty percent discount for broadcast ad-
vertisement 75 and a fifty percent discount in postal rates. 176  This
proposal, although quite tenable, has remained shelved in committee.
Unlike the Boren Bill, the bill's expenditure limits are reasonable. In
1986, 1606 House candidates spent nearly $239 million for primary and
general elections. 17 7 This represents about $550,000 per district, and
about $150,000 per candidate, at about four candidates per district. If
one assumes arguendo that the incumbents spent seventy percent of the
total, such incumbents would still not exceed the proposed $400,000 ex-
penditure limits. This bill would be more palatable, however, if the ex-
penditure limits were tied to the Consumer Price Index, as they are for
170. This criticism can be found in Alexander, The Future of Election Reform, 10 HAs-
TINGS CON. L. Q. 739, 740 (1983).
171. In England a candidate was granted relief when he broke the spending ceiling to
counter ad hominem reports about himself. In re Corrupt Practices Act 1883, 2 T.LR. 214
(1895). Under this philosophy, considering the volatile and personal nature of American poli-
tics, candidates would consistently be permitted to go over the prescribed spending limits.
172. S. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 503 (1987).
173. H.R. 2464, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
174. Id. § 110.
175. Id. § 203.
176. Id. § 204.
177. As reported by the Federal Election Commission. This correspondence is available at
the offices of the Hastings International & Comparative Law Review Office, or can be con-
firmed by telephoning the Commission at (800)424-9530 or (202)376-3120.
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presidential campaigns. 17 Otherwise, inflation could cause these spend-
ing limits to become impractically low. Therefore, examination of other
tools for campaign regulation is now in order.
I. CONTRIBUTION LIMITS: REGULATING THE
AMOUNT OF MONEY THIRD PARTIES
DONATE TO A CAMPAIGN
Contribution limits restrict the amount of money individuals and
institutions may donate to a campaign or a political action committee
(PAC).
A. American Regulation
Closely paralleling the development of expenditure limits, Congress
first introduced contribution regulation in the Tillman Act. 179 The Act
was also a response to the lobbying of President Theodore Roosevelt and
the Muckrakers.1 80 The Act prohibited national banks and corporations
from making any political contributions. 81 Officers and directors who
violated the statute faced fines and imprisonment.8 2 This regulation has
consistently been a part of law and remains so today.18 3 Prior to the
Tillman Act, the only campaign finance regulation employed was the
prohibition of federal employees and contractors from contributing. 184
In 1948 Congress included labor organizations in the category of
groups prohibited from contributing."8 This regulation also remains
part of current law.18 6 The rationale behind this prohibition (and that of
the expenditure limits also placed upon banks and corporations) was
that:
Direct corporate spending on political activity raises the prospect
that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to
provide an unfair advantage in the political marketplace . . .
[Although] [r]elative availability of funds is... a rough barometer of
public support, [t]he resources... of a business corporation... are not
178. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(c) (1982).
179. Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907).
180. See Note, supra note 70, at 282.
181. Ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 865 (1907).
182. The maximum sentence was one year. Id., 34 Stat. 864, 865.
183. See FCPA, ch. 368, § 313, 43 Stat. 1070, 1074 (1925); Ch. 645, § 610, 62 Stat. 683,
723-24 (1948); FECA 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 205, 86 Stat. 3, 10 (1972); 2 U.S.C. § 441b
(1982).
184. Note, supra note 70, at 282.
185. Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 723, 724 (1948).
186. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
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an indication of popular support for the corporation's political ideas
... .[T]he underlying theory of this regulation is that substantial
general purpose treasuries should not be diverted to political
purposes.18 7
Corporations, banks, and labor organizations are, however, permit-
ted to form political committees expressly established to engage in cam-
paign spending from funds voluntarily contributed by their shareholders
and employee members.' 88
The Tillman Act was challenged in United States v. Brewers Associa-
tion l9 as an unconstitutional infringement of the first amendment. The
District Court, however, rejected this assertion, claiming that employees
of the company could still contribute to a political campaign in their
individual capacities. However, in FEC v. Massachusetts Right to Life, 190
the Supreme Court held that the contribution limits were an unconstitu-
tional infringement on certain nonprofit corporations' right to free
speech. The Court stated that these "certain corporations" were
"formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas and cannot
[by their articles of incorporation] engage in business activities." 191 Fur-
thermore, these corporations have "no shareholders or other persons af-
filiated so as to have a claim on [their] assets .... ",192 In addition, these
corporations were "not established by a corporation or labor union and it
is [their] policy not to accept contributions from such entities. This pre-
vents such corporations from serving as conduits for the type of direct
spending that creates a threat to the political marketplace." 19 Notwith-
standing that these corporations could have founded political commit-
tees, the Court still found the limits too burdensome for this type of
corporation, mainly because of the rationale behind such regulation.' 94
The 1948 amendment to the Tillman Act also provided for the first
individual contribution limits of $5000.19 A violation carried either a
$5000 fine, five years imprisonment, or both. 196 Similar to expenditure
limits, the individual contribution limits were not generally enforced. 197
187. FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 107 S. Ct. 616, 628 (1986) (citing Pipefitters
v. U.S., 407 U.S. 385, 423-24 (1972) (quoting in part 117 CoNo. REc. 43,381)).
188. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1982).
189. 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916).
190. 107 S. Ct. 616 (1986).
191. Id. at 631.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 723 (1948).
196. Id.
197. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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The prohibition on labor contributions, however, was consistently en-
forced.198 FECA 1974199 lowered the individual contribution limit to
$1000 per candidate per election and put an aggregate $25,000 annual
cap on an individual's donation. PACs have a contribution limit of $5000
per election per candidate.
In Buckley v. Valeo 2°° these provisions were challenged as an un-
constitutional abridgement of freedoms of speech and association.0 1
The Supreme Court upheld the contribution limits, however, claiming
that they effectively advanced the Government's substantial interest in
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.2 °2 The Court
recognized a possible relationship between large donations and the ap-
pearance of corruption.20 ' The petitioners claimed that the $5000 contri-
bution limit on PACs infringed upon the freedom of association
guaranteed by the first amendment. 2 4 The Court, however, summarily
dismissed any freedom of association infringement arguments.20 5
B. Evaluating American Contribution Regulations
1. Rationale Behind Contribution Limits
In Buckley v. Vale0206 the Court found that contribution limits ef-
fectively curb any quid pro quo between the contributor and the recipient
politician. The Court, however, offered no hard evidence to support such
a finding.207 Nevertheless, some commentators equate campaign contri-
butions with bribery.208
If concern about quid pro quo relationships exists, then limits
should also be applied when the contributor gives something of value to
the candidate other than money (an endorsement, for example).20 9 Some
198. See United States v. Int'l Union of United Auto., Aircraft, & Agric. Implement Work.
ers of Am., 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. Painters Union Local No. 481, 79 F. Supp.
516 (D. Conn. 1948); United States v. Constr. & Gen'l Laborers I.ocal Union, 101 F. Supp.
869 (W.D. Mo. 1951); United States v. Anchorage Cent. Labor Council, 193 F. Supp. 504 (D.
Alaska 1961).
199. Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263 (1974).
200. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
201. Id. at 24, 25.
202. Id. at 23-28.
203. Id. at 27.
204. Id. at 35.
205. Id.
206. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
207. See id. at 23-38.
208. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 249, at 79.
209. See Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L.
REv. 784, 809-11 (1985).
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endorsements may be worth more than money. They can give a cam-
paign credibility, media exposure, and public acceptance. An endorse-
ment may also be detrimental.21 Compared to money, an endorsement
may be limited in influence and scope either geographically or
socioeconomically depending on the prominence and respectability of the
endorser. Money, of course, is neutral and knows no geographical or
social confines. In order to discourage any such quid pro quo between an
endorser and endorsee, regulation of endorsements would be consistent.
First amendment protections prevent such regulation. The Ninth Circuit
recently found California's election law prohibiting political parties from
endorsing candidates a violation of the first amendment.2 '
2. Circumvention of Contribution Limits
For the zealous supporter, contribution limits are not formidable
barriers to offering more assistance to a candidate. A supporter who al-
ready has contributed the maximum permissible amount to a campaign
may still donate money to PACs that support the candidate. Further-
more, a supporter may spend unlimited sums to communicate the advo-
cacy of a candidate as long as there is no coordination between these
independent expenditures and the official campaign strategem .2 2 Con-
tribution limits were introduced with a host of other regulations designed
to prevent the above scenario, but they were found to violate the first
amendment.213
3. Practical Effects of Contribution Limits
Contribution limits cause candidates to solicit contributions from
more people to collect the same amount of money that would otherwise
be available absent such limits. 214 These limits encourage challengers to
concentrate more on fundraising and less on such endeavors as formal
debates and precinct meetings. Incumbents must spend more time
"shaking the money tree" and less time legislating than they would in the
absence of contribution limits. 215 Several recent bills in Congress have
210. For example, Ku Klux Klan endorsements are generally not sought.
211. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. Eu, 826 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1987).
Endorsements should be encouraged, because they bring about distinctions among the candi-
dates (e-g., a Sierra Club candidate, or a National Organization for Women candidate). Since
endorsements by their nature are public, any undue post-election favor will be scrutinized.
212. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)(2)(B) (1982).
213. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See supra notes 103-139 and accompanying text.
214. H. ALEXANDER, supra note 249, at 7, 13.
215. See Boren, supra note 157, at 568.
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sought to increase contribution limits,2 16 one of which had proposed to
reduce them.217
Limits on contributions tend to favor incumbents. Incumbents al-
ready have an inherent advantage over challengers. Armed with better
name recognition, franking privileges, and a perpetual re-election com-
mittee, incumbents make formidable candidates, as is evident by their
astounding success at being re-elected.21 8 Few comentators seek to
change this part of the system.219 First, the suggestion is naive that in-
cumbents would radically alter a system that took possibly a lifetime to
master, and on which their careers depend. Second, the inherent advan-
tages tend to be components fundamental to representative democracies
and are not destabilizing nor malicious in and of themselves.
What is troublesome, however, is when regulation, in the name of
reform, further hinders challengers in a campaign that already favors the
incumbent. Contribution limits represent an example of such
regulations.
Typically, a challenger has a narrow, but enthusiastic base of sup-
port at the start of a campaign. The challenger seeks to broaden this
support through media advertisements, direct mailings, press releases,
and other methods, all of which require funds and a competent staff. The
candidate's most enthusiastic supporters typically will want to give more
than the $1000 limit since the candidate is their friend, relative, or one
whom they believe to be indispensible in saving civilization in spite of
itself. With contribution limits, the challenger is unable to optimize this
support. The campaign is handicapped in its efforts to raise the money
necessary to deliver the candidate's message. A serious supporter is not
likely to acquire any more influence than he already has in his current
capacity, that is, as a friend, relative, or convert. As explained below,
disclosure requirements best discourage quid pro quo.220
Incumbents, however, tend not to be hindered as much by contribu-
tion limits. With a past successful election (unless appointed) and a term
216. A bill proposed in the Senate sought to raise the limits from $1000 to $1500. S. 1806,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. § (a) (1985) A House proposal would have raised them from $1000 to
$2500 for Presidential campaigns. H.R. 2464, 100th Cong., 1st Sess, § 113 (1987).
217. H.R. 166, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § (b) (1987).
218. According to one observer, "Between 1946 and 1982, House incumbants won re-elec-
tion more than 90 percent of the time, while Senate incumbants won about 80 percent of their
races. In 1982, 92.7 percent of House incumbants won re-election, as did 93.3 percent of
Senate incumbants." Corn-Revere, The Race to Make Challengers Losers, STUDENT LAW.,
Mar. 1988, at 24, 27.
219. See id at 25 (quoting Prof. Ralph Winter, Jr.).
220. See infra notes 248-250 and accompanying text.
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of service under their belt, they usually will have a broad base of support
they can tap for smaller contributions. Contributors who want their do-
nations to count are more comfortable in giving to a favored incumbent
rather than an untested challenger, although it is not unusual for donors
to give to both candidates." 1
Probably the most nondemocratic result of contribution limits is
that it favors wealthy challengers over poorer ones. Wealthy candidates
need not worry about limitations on how much others can contribute to
their campaign since they themselves are not legally limited on how
much they can contribute to their own campaign.2t Politics has always
been the realm of the rich.3 Indeed, they are attractive candidates since
they have less motivation for graft and command the leisure necessary
for campaigning. However, Congress should not foster legislation that
grants further advantage to wealthy candidates in the name of reform.
America is, after all, a country that has always prided herself on her "log
cabin" presidents.
4. Contribution Limits in England
Unlike the United States, England does not have contribution regu-
lations.' 4 Contribution regulation, however, could effectively be em-
ployed without too much legal resistance because England does not have
the extensive first amendment freedoms of the United States
Constitution.225
England's electoral infrastructure is seemingly inconsistent in that it
prohibits any attempt of the citizenry to independently spend money pro-
moting or demoting a candidate," 6 yet there are no limits on how much
money an individual may contribute to a candidate directly. However,
England's expenditure limits act as quasi-contribution limits. If a candi-
date can only spend £200 in an election, then a £2000 contribution would
seem to court less influence than would be the case if no expenditure
limits were in place. Prohibitions on third-party spending 7 also act as
quasi-contribution limits (that is, donors cannot indirectly contribute to a
221. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 249, at 49.
222. Such a limit violates the candidate's right to free speech. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U..
1, 51-54 (1976). See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
223. See H. ALEXANDER, supra note 249, at 23, 45-64.
224. See generally 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 380-408 (4th ed. 1977).
225. Because British law is based on a system of parliamentary supremacy rather than
constitutional supremacy (as in the United States), Parliament can make any law it desires and
is not subject to judicial review. P. WALEs, supra note 52, at 13, 14, 16.
226. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
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candidate through independent expenditures as they could in the United
States).228
Another reason England may not have contribution limits is that
more money is probably contributed to the political parties rather than to
the candidates.229 Whether there should be limits on contributions to the
political parties is unclear. Since a union, corporation, or individual may
donate unlimited amounts of money to a political party (which is tanta-
mount to a contribution to the prime minister nominee of that party),
huge donations would likely court a successful party's prime minister's
attention.
Parliament is not likely to discourage corporations and labor organi-
zations from contributing to political campaign parties. The Conserva-
tive Party gets substantial backing from business and the Labour party
gets most of its funding from labor organizations.230 It does not follow,
however, that business or labor have a corrupting influence on Parlia-
ment when their parties are in power.231
IV. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: PUBLIC
SCRUTINY OF CONTRIBUTORS AND
CAMPAIGN ACCOUNTS
Disclosure laws require the reporting by candidates232 of informa-
tion on campaign expenditures and, more controversially, information
regarding contributors.
A. Disclosure Requirements in America
Disclosure requirements were first introduced in the United States
in legislation called "An Act provided for the Publicity of Contributions
Made for the Purpose of Influencing Elections at Which Representatives
228. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
229. This belief is speculative since disclosure of contributions is voluntary and is not veril-
fled for accuracy. But see Rentoul, 83% of Trade Unionists Vote for Labour, Naw STATES-
MAN, Mar. 28, 1986, at 5, 5; The Good Doctor's Good Friends, THE EcoNoMisT, July 20, 1985,
at 49, 49; Money Talks, THE ECONOMIST, June 4, 1983, at 40, 40; Stand Up and Be Counted,
THE ECONOMIST, May 4, 1985, at 58, 58; Tory Party Finances, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1984,
at 63, 63; Who Gave What--and Where it Went, ACCOUNTANcy, June 1985, at 6, 6.
230. Rentoul, supra note 229, at 5; The Good Doctor's Good Friends, supra note 159, at 49;
Money Talks, supra note 229, at 40; Stand Up and Be Counted, supra note 229, at 58; Tory
Party Finances, supra note 229, at 63; Who Gave What--and Where it Went, supra note 229, at
6.
231. Le., when the Labour Party is in power, labor fills the legislative agenda, and con-
versely, when the Conservative Party is in power, business dominates the legislative agenda,
232. In America, individuals who make independent expenditures in excess of $250 and
PACs are subject to disclosure regulation. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1982).
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of Congress Are Elected. ' '233 The Act required the candidate to file with
the Clerk of the House of Representatives statements, which thereafter
became public information. 34 Candidates were to disclose the overall
amounts received,235 the names and addresses of those contributing more
than $100,236 a list of expenditures 37 and outstanding loans. 38
Congress re-enacted and broadened these provisions in the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act to require disclosure from political committees. 239
FECA 19712' made only minor changes. FECA 1971 required disclo-
sure from political committees and the parties.241 The disclosure must
include the name and address of each person contributing more than ten
dollars, the occupation and principal place of business of those donating
more than $100, and the salaries of the campaign staff.242 All of this
material becomes public information.24 3 In 1934 the Supreme Court up-
held these disclosure requirements against a challenge that they unconsti-
tutionally infringed upon the prerogatives of the states' right to regulate
campaigns. 244
Like other aspects of American campaign law, the disclosure re-
quirements were widely circumvented before the enactment of FECA
1974, when the FEC was created.2 4 The Government required candi-
dates to report only contributions they received themselves or with their
knowledge.2" The data that were reported were virtually impossible to
use because no uniform rules existed for the compiling of reports, or pro-
visions for corrections and additions.2 47 In Buckley v. Valeo the disclo-
sure provision of FECA 1971 withstood a freedom of association
challenge under the first amendment.2
48
233. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392. 36 Stat. 822 (amended 1925).
234. Id. § 5.
235. Id. § 6.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Ch. 368, § 304, 43 Stat. 1070, 1071 (1925).
240. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
241. Id. §§ 304, 307, 86 Stat. 3, 14-16 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C §§ 432,437 (1982)).
242. Id. §§ 302, 304, 86 Stat. 3, 13-15 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.Q §§ 432,434 (1982)).
243. Id. § 308, 86 Stat. 3, 18 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 432(g)(5), 438(a)(4),
439(b)(3) (1982)).
244. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
245. See supra notes 64-111 and accompanying text.
246. Note, Comparative Study of U.S, and West German Political Finance Regulation,
supra note 78, at 551.
247. Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 900,
905 (1971).
248. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64-74 (1976).
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B. Analysis of Disclosure Requirements
Disclosure requirements represent the best mechanism to deter cor-
ruption or the appearance of corruption. Voters armed with this infor-
mation can decide for themselves at what threshold amount a sizable
contribution signifies corruption or its appearance. With high scrutiny
campaigns, it is strategically unsound to accept large donations from
some quarters. It is certainly to the opponent's advantage to promulgate
her adversary's more questionable contributions. The candidate's other
enemies are likely to do the same, and once the media smells a contro-
versy, they are apt to inquire as well.
To deter corruption (or the appearance of corruption), it is more
important to know who gave money than it is to know how much was
given. For example, voters will probably tolerate a $15,000 contribution
from the candidate's retired philanthropist-uncle, but may be more suspi-
cious of a $500 contribution from Greenpeace. Disclosure requirements
represent the most neutral of campaign regulations. They might even
put the incumbent at a disadvantage. Early in a campaign, before the
first disclosure reports are due, the challenger has access to disclosure
reports in the previous successful campaign of the incumbent. Further-
more, disclosure requirements might temper the millionaire's desire to
pour millions into her campaign in fear of an opponent's accusation that
she is trying to "buy the election."
Disclosure requirements probably create a chilling effect on contrib-
utors. Public scrutiny may deter donors from supporting radical candi-
dates. Furthermore, other fundraising entities, discovering the
contributor's propensity for generosity, are likely to solicit contribu-
tions.249 Lastly, disclosure requirements may discourage contributions
to opponents of an influential incumbent when a donor may politically,
economically, or socially be vulnerable to such an incumbent.
Most judicial concern for any inhibiting effect on contributors has
centered on minor party disclosure requirements. In Buckley v. Valeo,
the Supreme Court held that minor parties do not have to disclose when
there is a "reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of its
contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals
from either Government officials or private parties."2 50
C. Disclosure Requirements and Their Application to England
Unlike their counterparts in the United States, English disclosure
249. 81Technically, this is prohibited by 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(4) (1982).
250. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976).
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requirements are minimal. The English employ only disclosure neces-
sary to enforce expenditure regulations. That is, they require disclosure
of the nature of each expenditure and the parties involved. There are,
however, no disclosure requirements regarding contributors."
That England needs stricter disclosure regulations is tenable. Every
campaign year, the news media plays guessing games as to who gave how
much to each party.252 Although common knowledge suggests that the
Conservative Pary gets most of its money from business and corpora-
tions, the Labour Party from labor unions, and the Liberal Party from
subscriptions of party members, the parties themselves, however, often
claim otherwise.2"3
Recently, however, the British electorate has been undergoing a
metamorphosis. Voters seem less inclined to vote along traditional class
lines.254 The Labour Party suffers from a conflict between the "working-
man's left" and the "looney left."2 As observed by the National Re-
view's Anthony Lejeune, the Labour Party's "traditional working-class
and trade-union base is being eroded, while its new coalition of militant
marxists, welfare beneficiaries, public employees, feminists, homosexuals,
and . . . blacks is not large enough to win an election and positively
deters other sorts of voters." '256 Although the Labour and Conservative
parties currently occupy a combined 605 out of the 650 seats in Parlia-
ment,257 considerable attention is paid to England's other parties. In
1981 the Social Democratic Party, an offshoot of the Labour Party,
formed the "Alliance" by uniting with the Liberal Party, which had be-
come a shadow of the once powerful nineteenth-century party. Together,
the parties held forty-two seats.25 ' In the 1983 elections the Alliance
received twenty-six percent of the vote, compared to Labour's twenty-
eight percent, and the conservatives' forty-six percent," 9 but ended up
with only twenty-three seats."6 Second and third place district finishes
do not win seats in Parliament. Similar to congressional districts, only
the top vote-receiver for each district sits in Parliament.26 During the
251. See generally 15 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 399, 400 (4th ed. 1977).
252. See sources cited supra note 229.
253. Id.
254. Offand Running, TIME, June 1, 1987, at 34, 34.
255. Two Davids and Goliath, NEWSWEEK, May 25, 1987, at 26, 27.
256. Lejeune, No Slacking, NAT'L REV., July 17, 1987, at 38, 38.
257. All Revved Up, TIME, June 22, 1987, at 35, 35; Lejeune, supra note 256, at 38.
258. Two Davids and Goliath, supra note 255, at 27; Kellner, The Liberal/SDP Alliance:
An Obituary, NEW STATESMAN, June 26, 1987, at 7, 7.
259. Kellner, supra note 258, at 7.
260. All Revved Up, supra note 257, at 35.
261. Two Davids and Goliath, supra note 255, at 27.
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1987 campaign the Alliance offered itself as a "centrist" party, embracing
many of Labour's social policies, but supporting the Conservative Party's
stands on defense and trade unionism.262 The press even speculated
about the possibility of a "hung parliament. ' 263 Such conjecture proved
premature, however, since the Conservatives claimed victory with 376
seats,26' in comparison to Labour's 229.265 The Alliance Party received
twenty-two seats,266 and has since disbanded.267
The activity evidences that the electorate is redefining its character
and goals. Contributions, of course, can influence this flux and should be
scrutinized by the public so that voters can determine what element of a
party may have influence over the party leadership. Furthermore, stricter
disclosure regulations serve as a check on the expenditure limits. In Eng-
land, Parliament would serve the electorate well by enacting stronger dis-
closure regulation. Their public has an appetite for information regarding
sources of campaign finance that strict disclosure requirements would
satisfy.
V. REGULATION OF MEDIA: SUBSIDIZING
THE CANDIDATES
A. Broadcast Regulation in England and the United States
In the United States, broadcasters are required to permit candidates
to purchase the "lowest unit charge" for the time frame desired. 268 This
requirement applies during the forty-five days immediately preceding a
primary election and the sixty days preceding a general election.269 Con-
gress intended to benefit the financially disadvantaged candidates by
shortening the duration of campaigns and consequently the total cost of
campaigning. 27°
England goes one step further and grants the political parties free
262. Id. at 26, 27.
263. A Tactic Whose Time Has Come, NEW STATESMAN, Apr. 17, 1987, at 4, 4; Two
Davids and Goliath, supra note 255, at 27; Off and Running, supra note 254, at 35. A "hung
parliament" results when no single party wins an absolute majority.
264. Lejeune, supra note 256, at 38.
265. All Revved Up, supra note 257, at 35.
266. Id.
267. Kellner, supra note 259, at 7.
268. 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (1982).
269. Id.
270. Note, Equalizing Candidates' Opportunities for Expression, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
113, 120 (1982), citing S. Rep. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1773, 1781.
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broadcast time on radio and television." 1 However, the parties may not
purchase any additional broadcast time.2' For the three-and-a-half
week 1987 campaign, the Government awarded each political party five
ten-minute broadcasts on each channel.273 Consistent with English
third-party expenditure regulation,274 third parties are not permitted to
purchase broadcast ads.275
Congress has considered offering candidates free broadcast time. A
1981 bill was rejected for fear of proliferating publicity-starved fringe
candidates.276 Such concern seemed unwarranted, however, since pro-
posals have suggested a so-called "access" clause.277 That is, a candidate
would need petition signatures equal to five percent of the total votes cast
for the particular office at the previous election.27 8 A congressional grant
of free broadcast time should be constitutionally permissible. In Red
Lion Broadcasting v. FCC,279 the Supreme Court declared that broad-
casters do not have an absolute right to decide what will air over publicly
licensed frequencies.28 '
More recently, Congress introduced a proposal entitled the In-
formed Electoral Act of 1987.281 This Bill would have provided free tele-
vision time to the party committees, which in turn would allocate time to
eligible candidates.28 2 Each television station (licensed under the Com-
munications Act of 1934) would provide free prime-time.283 Minor par-
ties would have had to garnish five percent or more of the vote in the last
election in that district or state and present a petition representing signa-
tures of five percent or more of eligible voters for that district or state in
271. 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 700 (4th ed. 1974), citing REPORT OF THE COM-
MrTFEE ON BROADCASTING, 1960, CMND. SER. 1753, 294. See Leonard, Contrasts in Se-
lected Western Democracies, in PoLITIcAL FINANCE 64 (H. Alexander ed. 1980); Christopher,
UK Elections Shun Marathon Campaigns, ADVERTISING AGE, March 21, 1983, at 34, 34;
Lubenow, Politics American Style, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 1987, at 41, 41.
272. Christopher, supra note 271, at 34.
273. Lubenow, supra note 271, at 41.
274. See supra notes 41-69 and accompanying text.
275. Representation of the People Act 1983, ch. 2, §§ 92, 93, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S
STATUTES OF ENGLAND 574-75 (4th ed. 1986).
276. Note, supra note 270, at 127 (citing Political Broadcasts--1971: Hearings on H..
8627, H. 8628 (and related bills) before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 165 (1971)).
277. Id. (citing H.R. 1451, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)).
278. Id.
279. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
280. See Note, supra note 270, at 125-127.
281. S. 593, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
282. Id. § 502.
283. Id.
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order to qualify for free television time.284 This Bill has been shelved and
justly so. First, it was unclear how much time a television station was to
provide; second, the rationale in using political committees to dole out
the free time is also unclear.
Another Bill, entitled the Campaign Cost Reduction and Reform
Act of 1987285 would have provided a 30% discount in broadcast rates
for House Candidates286 when they agree to limit their expenditures to
$200,000 for the primary campaign and $200,000 :For the general elec-
tion.287 As noted above,288 these expenditure rates seem tenable.
If a congressional goal is to lessen the expense of campaigning, then
candidates could be asked to waive their first amendment rights to buy
unlimited slots of airtime in exchange for a certain amount of free broad-
cast time. The critical question becomes: How much air time is neces-
sary? Enough time is needed to entice wealthy challengers and
incumbents alike to run an effective campaign. If too much free broad-
cast time is proposed, however, it would surely be defeated by a Congress
conscious of overfunding their opponents. Experts claim that a candi-
date with no name recognition would need up to seventeen messages
"before the product registers" to the voters.289
Under this Note's proposal, eligible preprimary congressional candi-
dates would be granted 100 units of free broadcast time. Eligibility re-
quirements would be achieved by collecting petition signatures of five
percent of the number of votes cast for the particular office at the last
general election. These 100 units could be exchanged for seven minutes
of prime time at each station within each metropolitan area in the district
(equivalent to fourteen thirty-second spots each), or 100 units could buy
fourteen minutes of nonprime time in the same manner (good for twenty-
eight 30-second spots), or some combination of prime and nonprime time
could be developed based on this formula. Postprimary congressional
candidates of each major party would be granted 200 units each to be
used in the same manner. Minor parties and independent candidates
would need to satisfy the five percent petition requirement to be awarded
fifty units, or a fifteen percent petition requirement to be awarded 200
units.
Presidential candidates are probably not in need of such a grant.
284. Id. § 501.
285. H.R. 2464, 100th Conj., 1st Sess. (1987).
286. Id. § 203.
287. Id. § 110.
288. See supra notes 173-177 and accompanying text.
289. San Diego Union, Oct. 19, 1987, B-I, at B-5, col. 3.
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First, they already receive monetary grants matching certain fundraising
criteria.29 Second, presidential candidates probably recieve ample
broadcast exposure absent any such grants. Candidates publicly start
campaigning for their party's nomination in Iowa prior to that state's
caucus. This part of the system is not conducive to a media campaign."9 1
Money cannot buy, and television is no substitute for, the hand shaking
and baby kissing necessary for the Iowa caucus process. Even in a
crowded presidential field, the news media promotes coverage of the
long-shot candidates.292 Certainly post-nomination candidates receive
enough media coverage, coupled with public funding, to make it unnec-
essary to grant free broadcast time to them.
B. Postal Subsidies in England and the United States
Since 1949, Parliament has provided for free postage for all parlia-
mentary candidates.2 93 Each nominee is permitted to send one postal
communication of up to two ounces per voter.294
In the United States, media subsidies could be supplemented with
free postage. Currently, American political parties are offered a reduced
third-class rate.2 95 Congress *has considered offering Congressional can-
didates reduced postal rates.29 6 Each of these Bills, however, tied the
reduction in postal rates to expenditure limits2 97 and have not become
law. A better proposal may be to offer eligible candidates free postage in
exchange for a waiver of their first amendment right to purchase unlim-
ited postage. Eligibility requirements would be identical to those neces-
sary to receive free television time.29 Experts claim that up to five or six
mailings are necessary before voters are influenced.299 Congress may be
persuaded to provide each eligible candidate with two preprimary and
290. See supra notes 140-172 and accompanying text.
291. San Francisco Exam., Feb. 8, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
292. The following "dark horse" candidates all received national coverage from the news
media for the respective campaign cited: Alexander Haig, Bob Dole, John Connaly, and Bob
Crane in 1980; Alan Cranston, Reubin Askew, and Jesse Jackson in 1984; Alexander Haig,
Jack Kemp, Pete Dupont, Bruce Babbit, Al Gore, Paul Simon, Richard Gephardt, and
Michael Dukakis in 1988.
293. Representation of the People Act 1949, 12-14 Geo. 6, ch. 68, § 79, reprinted in 11
HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 624 (3d ed. 1969); Representation of the People Act
1983, ch. 2, § 91, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 573 (4th ed. 1986).
294. Id.
295. 39 U.S.C. § 3626 (1982).
296. S. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 504 (1987).
297. See supra notes 154-178 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 289-290 and accompanying text.
299. San Diego Union, Oct. 19, 1987, B-5, at B-5, col 3.
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three post-primary mailings, when they consider that the intervening
four months between primary day and election day would amount to less
than one mailing per month. This proposal would overcome some of the
incumbent's advantageous franking privileges and keep campaigns af-
fordable. Therefore, a proposal of this type should merit serious study
from any congressional committee contemplating campaign finance re-
form laws.
C. Identification Requirements in England
To provide enforcement officials with a better accounting of expen-
diture regulations, all campaign literature3 1 in England must bear
the name and address of the printer and publisher.30 1 This legislation
was first implemented in the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention
Act 1883 and remains part of current law.30 2 A violation is an illegal act.
However, violators may petition for relief if their act was
"inadvertent. '30 3
D. Identification Requirements in the United States
In the United States, a like identification requirement has been in
effect since 1948. 3°4 This identification requirement extends also to elec-
tronic media. Specifically, the campaign message must state what entity
financed the message and whether the communication was authorized by
the "candidate or candidate's committee. 30 5 Identification requirements
are designed to educate the audience about the source of the message. A
proposal that grants free broadcast time and postage to candidates is ad-
vocated as an effort to check what courts and commentators consider to
be the corrupting influence of the need for large amount of money in a
campaign.30 6 As with any attempt to modify expenditures, consideration
must be given to the effect of third-party independent expenditures, while
respecting their first amendment freedoms.
300. Defined as a "bill, placard, poster or document." Representation of the People Act
1983, § 10, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND 558 (4th ed. 1986).
301. Representation of the People Act 1983, ch. 2, § 91, reprinted in 15 HALSBURY'S STAT-
UTES OF ENGLAND 573 (4th ed. 1986).
302. Id.
303. Id. § 110(3). See supra notes 27-40 and accompanying text.
304. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 612, 62 Stat. 683, 724 (1948) (current version at 2
U.S.C. § 441d (1982)).
305. 2 U.S.C. § 441d (1982).
306. See Note, supra note 70; Sorauf, Caught in a Political Thicket: The Supreme Court
and Campaign Finance, 3 CONST. COMMENTARY 97 (1986); Moore, Public Financing of Elec-
tions: New Proposals To Meet New Obstacles, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 861 (1985); Forrester,
supra note 140.
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Identification requirements are effectuated to serve these ends. A
better identification requirement, however, would require an announce-
ment to include the name of any connected or affiliated entity. For ex-
ample, when the voters hear a scathing commentary attacking candidate
X, it would be followed by, "This message provided by Committee for
Good Government, affiliated with Corporation Z, and is approved (or
not approved) by Candidate Y." The audience then could ponder the
message in a more informed context. Several Congressional proposals
have sought to modify identification requirements in this manner."0 7
Courts have found that identification requirements do not infringe
upon first amendment rights. 08 The burden required is minimal and
does not in any appreciable manner deter free speech or political debate.
In U.S. v. Scott,"3 9 the North Dakota District Court found "highly spec-
ulative and conjectural" the defendant's claim that he failed to identify
himself as the source of some pamphlets he distributed because he feared
reprisal.3 10
Members of PACs may claim that their first amendment rights to
privacy of association and belief are being violated. Identification re-
quirements, however, only request the name of the PAC, and not those
of individual members. Finally, PAC members may claim another un-
constitutional infringement of free speech in that during the time the
sponsor of the advertisement is identifying herself (or in the case of the
print media, in the space for printed identification of the sponsor ), the
sponsor is restrained from providing additional communication. This ar-
gument has yet to be made. A court is likely to find identification re-
quirements commendable because they serve the dual purposes of
educating the public about who supports the candidate (thereby allowing
the public to discern the ramifications of such support), and they better
enable the FEC to enforce contribution requirements.
VI. CONCLUSION
England and the United States have implemented various schemes
of campaign finance regulation to combat corruption, and the appearance
of corruption. Expenditure limits have been employed in England since
1883, and were first introduced to the United States in 1911. English
expenditure limits are rigorous and serve as their primary tool of cam-
307. S. 186, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § (d) (1985); H.R. 2464, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 115
(1987); H.R. 166, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § (d) (1987).
308. United States v. Scott, 195 F. Supp. 440 (D.N.D. 1961).
309. Id.
310. Id. at 443.
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paign finance regulation. Such regulation interferes ;ignificantly with the
populace's freedom of expression and association. :[n the United States
this type of regulation violates the candidate's first amendment rights ab-
sent some sort of waiver. The effectiveness of expenditure regulation in
combatting corruption or the appearance thereof is debatable, particu-
larly in the absence of contribution limits and disclosure requirements.
Contribution limits have been employed in the United States since
1907. Banks, labor organizations, and most corporations are prohibited
from making political contributions (and expenditures) using the organi-
zations' treasuries. This restriction is effective in preventing corruption
or the appearance thereof because it prevents wealth accumulated in the
economic marketplace from having undue influence over the political
marketplace. The Supreme Court has found that contribution limits on
individuals do not offend the first amendment because they promote the
government's compelling interest of preventing corruption or the appear-
ance thereof. Contribution limits, however, may be circumvented by do-
nating to a PAC allied with a candidate, or through independent
expenditures by the contributor on behalf of the candidate. Moreover,
contribution limits pose a greater burden for more impecunious challeng-
ers than for wealthy candidates and incumbents. Contribution limits
should be repealed, permitting disclosure requirements to assist the pop-
ulace in monitoring any corrupting influence of large donations. Parlia-
ment has apparently found no such reason to employ contribution limits
since donations are typically made to the political parties in England
rather than to individual candidates. Also, England's strict expenditure
regulations act as quasi-contribution limits.
Disclosure requirements have been successful in the United States.
They educate the public about who supports a candidate, thereby permit-
ting it to scrutinize any post-election favors. The disadvantage of disclo-
sure requirements is that they may have a chilling effect, thus deterring
citizens from contributing money to a campaign. Disclosure require-
ments in England are minimal, and Parliament would be wise to adopt
stricter standards. First, they would operate as a check against any cir-
cumvention of expenditure regulation. Second, more public education
about the source of campaign funds would deter corrupting practices.
In England, political parties are granted free broadcast time, and
candidates are granted free postage. In the United States, limited grants
of free broadcasting and postage to Congressional candidates, in ex-
change for a waiver of those candidates' first amendment right to
purchase additional broadcast time or postage, should lessen spiraling
[Vol. I1I
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campaign costs, and thereby lessen a candidate's dependence on
contributions.
In the United States, identification requirements are employed for
all campaign media to inform the public about the source of campaign
messages. England also requires identification statements to assist in the
enforcement of expenditure limits.
Like any law, campaign finance laws must be enforced to be effec-
five. Historically, American campaign finance laws have been intermit-
tently enforced at best. With the birth of the FEC in 1974, enforcement
has been more consistent. In the final analysis, the regulation of political
money is best done in moderation by employing a series of tools to per-
fect the campaign finance regulation machinery.

